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vis-à-vis  its  neighbourhood,  especially  in  the  last  decade,  it  examines  how  the  mechanism  of 
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The  Europeanization  process  means  ―the  reform  of  domestic  structures,  institutions  and 
policies  in  order  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  systematic  logic,  political  dynamics  and 
administrative mechanisms of European integration‖ (Joseph, 2006, p. 2). Europeanization is often 
seen  as  a  constant  ―interaction  between  the  national  and  the  European  levels‖  (Risse,  Cowles, 
Caporoso, 2001, p. 2), ―as a merger of the top-down and bottom-up perspectives‖ (B￶rzel, Risse, 
2003, p. 57). The thorough understanding of the domestic environment upon which Europeanization 
impacts  is  an  essential  prerequisite  in  order  to  explore  the  mechanisms  of  this  process.  Thus, 
Ladrech perceives Europeanization as an ―incremental process reorienting the direction and shape 
of politics to the degree that European Community political and economic dynamics become part of 
the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making‖ (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). As far as the 
changes at the national  level  are concerned, they shape  domestic structures, specifically  ―those    
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components of a polity or society consisting of regularised and comparatively stable interactions 
(i.e.  institutions,  formal  and  informal,  organizational  routines  and  cultures,  collective 
understandings of actors).‖ (Risse, Cowles, Caporoso, 2001, p. 2) 
In  other  words,  Europeanization  consists,  according  to  Radaelli,  of  ―processes  of  (a) 
construction (b) diffusion, and (c)  institutionalization  of  formal and  informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined 
and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national 
and sub-national) discourse, political structures, and public policies.‖ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30)  
Despite  the  diverse  meanings  that  the  concept  of  Europeanization  acquires  within  the 
literature, all of the aforementioned approaches share the assumption that this process is mainly 
limited  to  the  EU  member  states.  However,  recent  contributions  to  the  European  integration 
literature have pointed out that the Europeanization process could be influential even beyond the 
EU’s geographic boundaries, principally with regards to candidate countries. Thus, the concept of 
Europeanization differentiates between traditional Europeanization, which is mainly limited to the 
EU member states, and enlargement-led Europeanization, which affects candidate countries and is 
conditionality-driven.  
Although  Papadimitriou  and  Phinnemore  argue  that  the  new  eastward-looking 
Europeanization literature displays little consensus on how the Europeanization process is exported 
to  and  is  transforming  the  candidate  countries  (Papadimitriou,  Phinnemore,  2003,  p.  9),  most 
researchers agree that the impact of Europeanization is much more visible in the case of candidate 
countries than in that of member states.
  
The EU’s imposed conditionality has been the main driving force behind the Europeanization 
(especially  in  the  case  of  enlargements  from  2004  and  2007).  This  conditionality  could  be 
enmeshed  in  the  so  called  Copenhagen  criteria  (notably  the  existence  of  stable  democratic 
institutions,  the  functioning  of  market  economy  and  the  availability  to  adopt  the  acquis 
communautaire) which  now the current candidates  – Turkey, Croatia and  the  former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) – for EU membership are trying to meet. ―The Copenhagen 
political criteria constitute the leverage that is making Turkish modernisation and democratisation 
more  plural,  multi-cultural  and  consolidated.‖  (Aydin,  Keyman,  2004,  p.  1)  Besides  the  main 
criteria, states wishing to enter the Union also have to provide stable institutions forging the spread 
of norms on human rights, protection of minorities, respect for the rule of law, good relations with 
their neighbours, and to align themselves to political, economic and monetary objectives of the 
union. According to Grabbe, the perspective of joining the EU represents a strong incentive for the    
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candidate states to meet the requirements for a potential EU membership and to demonstrate their 
willingness to fulfil the accession criteria. (Grabbe, 2001, p. 1015) 
Schimmelfennig  and  Sedelmeier  hold  that  the  dominant  logic  underpinning  the  EU’s 
conditionality  is  the  bargaining  strategy  of  reinforcement  by  reward:  the  EU  provides  external 
stimuli  for  a  candidate  country  in  order  to  comply  with  its  conditions.  (Schimmelfennig, 
Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 662) Since the Helsinki Summit from 1999 when Turkey was offered the 
candidate status, the Turkish Parliament has sought to upgrade Turkish legislation in tune with the 
European  standards.  Smith  believes  that  conditionality  could  be  of  two  types,  both  with 
considerable leverage: the EU manages the progress made by the candidates and either offers them 
the chance of carrying on the negotiations (positive conditionality) or it delays the implementation 
of the following stages (negative conditionality). An example of the use of negative conditionality 
consisted in the delayed agreements on the customs union between the EU and Turkey, due to 
different irregularities concerning human rights and democracy. (Smith, 1998) 
In one of her studies, Grabbe analyses the changes which occurred in the Central Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) in the prospect of membership. Her remarks could also be applied 
successfully  to  the  present  applicants  for  EU-membership  which  largely  undergo  the  same 
transformation  as  the  CEECs,  because  basically  ―Turkey  is  subject  to  the  same  conditionality 
regime as the CEECs‖. (Schimmelfenning, Engert, Knobel, 2003, p. 506) Not only are the means 
used by the EU to influence the reforms in the candidate countries superior to those used in former 
cases, but also the applicants can barely contribute to the EU policy making from inside. Neither 
CEECs applicants nor the group of Turkey, Croatia and FYROM had the possibility of opt-outs 
from parts of the agenda, such as those obtained by the UK on the Social Chapter, Schengen, or 
monetary union. (Grabbe, 2003)  
Hence, the EU has often used the carrot and stick method to put pressure on Turkey to desist 
from taking norm-violating actions. One striking example could be the bid addresses to Turkey to 
commute the sentence of the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Öcalan 
from death to life-long imprisonment.  
In terms of foreign affairs, when Turkey threatened to annex Northern Cyprus in November 
2001, the then EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen warned Turkey that it would irreversibly 
loose its chance to join the Union. (Schimmelfenning, Engert, Knobel, 2003, p. 507) After Turkey 
received the candidate status in 1999, the EU conditionality has produced its first significant effects. 
The legislative package passed by the Turkish Parliament in August 2002 included the abolition of 
the death penalty in peacetime and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority (the teaching of Kurdish 
in education and its use in broadcasting). In addition, the prospect of EU membership sparked off    
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the commencement of a normalised relation between Turkey and its neighbourhood. (Grabbe, 2003, 
p. 305; Schimmelfenning, Engert, Knobel 2003, p. 508) 
According to Grabbe the factors which contribute to a greater convergence with the EU norms 
would be the speed of adjustment of the applicant countries to the EU standards owing to their 
ardent desire to joint the club and the openness of the candidate states to take over the EU’s acquis. 
(Grabbe, 2003, pp. 306-307) Moreover, it could be underlined that the EU’s agenda for Turkey, 
Croatia  and  FYROM  has  become  even  broader  than  for  previous  applicants  and  this  through 
additional  membership  conditions  tailored  to  each  country’s  specific.  Grabbe  identifies  five 
mechanisms  through  which  the  Europeanization  principles  are  internalised  into  the  candidate 
countries:  1)  Models:  provision  of  legislative  and  institutional  templates  to  adopt  the  existing 
European  laws and  norms; 2) Money: aid and technical assistance (to support the costs of the 
implementation  process);  3)  Benchmarking  and  monitoring;  4)  Advice  and  twinning;  5)  Gate-
keeping. Among these, the latter two are specific to applicant countries: the twinning programme is 
a mechanism which allows for the interference of the EU in the candidate countries’ policy, and 
gate-keeping gives access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process according to 
the progresses made. (Grabbe, 2003, pp. 312-314) 
Onis  underlines  that  while  the  external  incentive  for  change  remains  strong,  the  primary 
impetus for the country’s transformation stems from domestic actors. (Onis, 2003, p. 9) ―Turkey’s 
correct transposition and implementation of the acquis will determine the pace of negotiations.‖ 
(Joseph, 2006, p. 7) However, in Ugur’s assertion, the Europeanization process in Turkey is seen as 
hard to fulfil, in comparison to the EU-27. Many chapters of the acquis are still unsolved and the 
transposition into the Turkish legislature is slow, which could still preclude Turkey from accession. 
This is possible because sometimes Turkish policy-makers have consistently tried to reform the 
country  mainly  from  a  Turkish  orientation.  As  a  result,  ―the  country  is  currently  the  most 
economically integrated, yet politically distanced candidate for membership‖ (Ugur, 2001, pp. 217-
218). An explanation could  be that Kemalism, the  nationalist doctrine of the Turkish state, ―is 
partially based on values alien to western liberal democracy and has engendered domestic political 
practices in conflict with core European democratic and human rights norms.‖ (Schimmelfenning, 
Engert, Knobel, 2003, p. 506) 
However, ―the European perspective proved one of the main incentives for reforms of the 
political and legal system in Turkey‖. (European Commission, 2007, p. 8) The candidate status 
offered to Turkey  in 1999 represented a fundamental turning point in Turkey-EU relations and 
accelerated the  momentum  of  political  and  economic  reforms.  Since  then,  Europeanization  has 
become a strong instrument not only in shaping the country’s domestic policies and accelerating the    
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reforms, but also in transforming Turkey’s approach towards foreign affairs issues, as pointed out 
further.  
The post-Cold War European politics has wielded a great influence on Turkey’s place in the 
new European security order and also determined the country’s recent political inclinations and 
decisions. (Howorth, 2007, p. 90) Especially since it was awarded the candidate status, Turkey’s 
stance has changed considerably: the country engagement in a long reform process increased its 
openness towards the EU acquis and the Europeanization mechanisms. From Turkey’s perspective, 
there is no other alternative political goal apart from its full participation in the EU. Membership in 
the  Union  is  still  perceived  as  the  ultimate  requirement  to  fulfil  the  Kemalist  imperative  of 
identification with  Western  modernity. (Grigoriadis, 2006, p. 150)  NATO  membership alone  is 
sometimes regarded as insufficient to satisfy current political and economic needs and aspirations. 
Moreover, Turkey considers its inclusion in the EU and in its security framework, the European 
Security and Defence Policy, also as a possibility of enhancing its own security. (Terzi, 2004, p. 
113)  As  a  civil  power  combining  trade  and  aid  leverages  rather  than  relying  on  military 
competences, and still not an efficient security actor externally, the EU is best seen as a security 
community than as a security actor. (Park, 2005) 
Turkey’s quest to join the EU and the conditionality the EU employs with candidate countries 
are two decisive factors that bring about the emergence of a new approach toward foreign policy in 
Turkey. (Kirisci, 2006, p. 29)  
Traditionally,  Turkish  thinking  vis-à-vis  international  relations  has  been  enmeshed  by  a 
Hobbesian vision (ideas sprung from Thomas Hobbes’ ―Leviathan‖) that depicted the international 
environment with mistrust, as being both anarchical and unpredictable and therefore creating the 
urgent  need  to  rely  on  self-help  and  military.  Opposed  to the  Hobbesian  outlook, the  Kantian 
culture (Immanuel Kant’s ―Perpetual Peace‖) is associated with a world of democratic peace and 
commitment to seeking win-win outcomes to international conflicts. Such outcomes are ensured by 
the  willingness  to  rely  on  soft  power  rather  than  hard  power.  The  Kantian  state  would  forge 
pluralism, cultural and ethnic diversity  internally, whereas externally  would  be  linked with the 
international  environment  through  close  cooperation  and  friendly  societal  ties,  features  which 
generally characterise the EU’s image worldwide. (Kirisci, 2006)  
From a geographical point of view, Turkey’s unique position straddling Europe, the Middle 
East  and  Eurasia  constitutes one  of  the  most  conflict-prone  regions  of  the  world.  This  pivotal 
position has largely contributed to the way Turkey shaped its security outlook and laid it bare that 
national security considerations had been a priority on its foreign relations. Not surprisingly, apart 
from the domestic threats, the Turkish National Security Policy Document identifies Greece and the    
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South  (meaning  Syria,  Iran,  Iraq)  as  main  external  threats.  (Drorian,  2005,  p.  269)  ―Its  close 
proximity to the former Soviet Union as well as to the potentially unstable areas of the Middle East 
meant  that  Turkey  had  to  be  vigilant  in  its  security  assessments  and  confident  in  its  military 
capabilities‖.  (Drorian,  2005,  p.  258)  Indeed,  Turkey’s  attitude  towards  its  unpredictable 
neighbourhood could be backed up by the offensive Realist theory elaborated by Mearsheimer, who 
argues that the best path to peace is to constantly increase their power and military capacities owing 
to  the  level  of  uncertainty  springing  from  their  proximity.  (Dunne,  Schmidt,  2008,  p.  99) 
Accordingly, Turkey’s military force outnumbers by far the ones belonging to the countries from its 
vicinity. It also retains the second largest army in NATO after the US and spends a considerable 
portion of its national budget on defence.
 (Drorian, 2005, p. 262)  
In the past, Turkey had a propensity to belligerent, hard actions such as: the use of military 
force on Cyprus in 1974, the frequent incursions in northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish militants, 
and the threat of force against Syria in 1998 for sheltering the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan. (Everts, 2004, p. 3) However, since 1999 when Turkey was conferred the 
candidate  status  and  particularly  after  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  (AKP)  took  the 
administrative  reins  in  2002,  the  Turkish  foreign  and  domestic  policy  changed  significantly, 
embarking on a milder, balanced Kantian approach. ―The EU has succeeded in having an impact on 
Turkey’s culture of anarchy and moving the country out of a Hobbesian world towards a Kantian 
one‖,  upholds  Kirisci.  (Kirisci,  2006,  p.  103)  Specifically,  the  AKP  awareness  that  this  hard, 
Hobbesian orientation would harm Turkey’s credentials contributed to this new approach towards 
foreign policy in line with the EU demands.  
Accordingly Turkey redefined its foreign policy priorities as follows: firstly, Turkey became 
much more benign and constructive towards issues which previously were treated very strictly as in 
the Cyprus and Armenia cases. Secondly, Ankara fostered closer relations with the neighbouring 
countries, in antithesis with the past when the proclivity to open conflicts was high (the relations 
with Greece and Syria for instance improved significantly). Thirdly, Turkey’s current government’s 
new foreign policy is a growing move from seeing the world from a win-lose realpolitik perspective 
to a win-win one. (Kirisci, 2006) 
This progress has also been accompanied by many EU reforms that amplified the role of civil 
society in the process of defining national security offsetting thus the military influence. (Kirisci 
2006, 29) Although the army accepts the civilian rule, this control has many times been artificial, 
the four military coups from 1969, 1971, 1980 and 1997 standing as a proof. (Drorian, 2005) 
Hence,  when  assessing  the  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  its  move  from  a  hard  Hobbesian 
security mentality to a much softer, Kantian one, in line with the EU requirements, it is important to    
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analyse the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy in relation to its neighbours. Thus, a brief 
overview of Turkey’s present relations with its vicinity will be included. 
Throughout the time Ankara’s diplomacy has always reflected the complexity and diversity of 
Turkey’s geopolitical circumstances. Turkey is situated in the epicentre of three troubled regions, 
straddling the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Due to its location, Turkey represents an 
important asset for the West. ―In a security environment increasingly characterised by transregional 
problems, Turkey is a transregional partner par excellence‖, argues Lesser. (Lesser, 2000, p. 1) In 
the  aftermath  of  the  Cold  War  the  expansionist  threat  has  become  less  salient.  However,  the 
attention  shifted  to  other  transnational  risks  that  could  jeopardise  the  stability  and  security  of 
Europe’s  periphery:  spillovers  of  terrorism,  political  turmoil,  ethnic  and  religious  radicalism, 
proliferation of WMD. (Lesser, 2000, p. 1)  
Owing  to  its  pivotal  position,  Turkey  has  been  many  times  regarded  as  bridge  in  the 
international relations literature. The country’s important role in the promotion of stability, as well 
as for providing and guarding important linkages of trade and energy routes has always scored high 
(such as, most recently, the Nabucco project, which involves Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary 
and Austria and is meant to supply Europe with gas, most probably from the Caspian Sea, and thus, 
reduce Europe’s dependence upon Russian gas).  
In recent years, especially after the terror attacks of 9/11, a geo-cultural dimension has also 
been  added to this geo-strategic position,  focusing on Turkey’s potential to act as  a  model  for 
regime transformation and democratisation in this ―clash of civilizations‖ basin (Huntington, 1993, 
p. 54). 
Turkey’s effort in fostering stability and security in Europe’s proximity has been very useful 
for the EU. Firstly, this effort concretised through the establishment of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Project (BSEC) in 1992 whose role was to ensure that the Black Sea countries would 
enhance stability in the region by common understanding of peace, stability, democracy and the 
spirit of conciliation.  
Turkey has also become since the end of the Cold War a more important regional actor in the 
Middle East. The country’s network of contacts corroborated today with the political capital of the 
AKP government and its long-standing economic connections with the Arab world are major assets 
especially for the EU’s south-eastern periphery. (Everts, 2004, p. 4) Turkey’s friendly relationship 
with Israel could be very useful and supportive in breaking the deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process.
 Whereas the international community has not come to terms with the Hamas-led 
government in Gaza, the Turks have maintained favourable relations with them. Both the EU and    
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Turkey have given priority to the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an important catalyst 
of problems throughout the Middle East. (Key conclusions of the 4
th Bosphorus conference, 2007) 
Turkey and Syria have had tensioned relations for decades owing to Syria’s support for the 
PKK. But after the Syrians expelled Ocalan in 1998 and especially after the advent to power of the 
AKP  the  rapprochement  intensified.  At  the  present  moment,  the  EU  is  working  together  with 
Turkey  in  drawing  Syria  into  a  wider  web  of  international  cooperation.  Together, the  EU  and 
Turkey could demonstrate that a soft political strategy can achieve better results than America’s 
inclination to aggressive actions. (Everts, 2004, pp. 6-7) As a proof of the better relations, Erdogan 
has had several meetings with Syrian President al-Assad in which the Turkish mediation of Syria-
Israel peace talks and Iran’s nuclear programme were discussed. (Hurriyet English, 2008b) 
In order to comply with the CFSP’s principles, Turkey ceased its military operation against 
PKK bases in northern Iraq. Contrary to what was presumed, that Turkey had an interest in Iraq’s 
breakdown and in its rich oil sources, Turkey was the most ardent supporter of Iraq’s territorial 
integrity. (Laciner, 2005, p. 45) In March 2003 the Turkish parliament opposed to Washington’s 
request to launch its attacks from Turkey, which gained Arabs’ and the neighbouring countries’ 
appreciation. (Everts, 2004, p. 3) Turkey’s approach towards Iraq is very much similar to that of the 
EU, as also emphasised by the Commission. ―There is large convergence of views between Turkey 
and the EU about the need for a stable, predictable and democratic Iraq‖. (European Commission, 
2004, p. 7) Clearly, AKP does not share anymore Turkey’s traditional Kemalist tendency to avoid 
being  involved  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood,  and  instead  prefers  to  engage  actively  and 
constructively with it. (Park, 2005, p. 130) 
Turkish-Iranian relationship has also become more active under the AKP government. Albeit 
tense since the Islamic revolution in 1979, in the last couple of years Turkey-Iran relations have 
improved significantly owing especially to a strong cooperation in the business and energetic fields. 
In past, ―Turkey’s membership of NATO and its military links with the US were regarded with 
suspicion in Teheran.‖ (European Commission, 2004, p. 7) This is the reason why, in terms of 
diplomatic strategy, Turkey’s thinking was more in line with the EU’s soft strategy than with that of 
the US, which believed, under the Bush administration, that the appropriate way to deal with Iran is 
through isolation and pressure. Thus Turkey has strongly supported the EU’s efforts to obtain long-
term guarantees for the implementation by Iran of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  (Aydin,  Acikmese,  2007,  p.  272)  The  improved  relation 
between AKP and Iranian leaders, coupled with the visa-free travel conditions, the transportation 
agreement,  which  would  generate  a  trade  volume  of  20  billion  USD between  Turkey  and  Iran 
(Hurriyet English, 2009a) are proofs of Turkey’s embarking on a constructive diplomatic approach.    
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(Everts,  2004,  p.  6)  The  completion  of  the  Tabriz-Erzurum  gas  pipeline  confirmed  that  both 
countries  are  seeking  a  strong  economic  cooperation.  This  pipeline  is  also  of  great  interest  to 
Europe as it should allow Iranian gas – and that of other countries in the Caspian Sea – to reach 
European markets at a competitive price, diminishing thus the Russian monopoly. Iran could also be 
one of the future providers of gas for the Nabucco pipeline, the EU-backed project designed to 
counter Russia’s strong influence on European energy supplies. 
Georgia  is  another  important  neighbour  with  which  Turkey  has  a  special  relationship. 
Moreover, Georgia has a special role in fostering security and stabilisation in the region and this 
owing to its partnerships with NATO (Partnership  for Peace and Individual Partnership  Action 
Plan).  For strengthening the economic ties Turkey signed a Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation 
with Georgia in 1992 and also supported Tbilisi’s efforts to entry into the BSEC in 1992.  
Regarding the last year Georgian-Russian conflict, Turkey through the voice of its former 
foreign minister Babacan condemned the violence and advocated the rapid need to reach a peaceful 
solution. (Hurriyet English, 2008b) In addition, Turkey has proposed the formation of a Caucasian 
union  which  could  forge  future  stability  in  the  region.  (Hurriyet  English,  2008c)  This  action 
concretised  through  the  EU’s  Eastern  Partnership  scheme  that  aims  at  fostering  cooperation 
between the EU and the six ex-Soviet eastern neighbours (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus). (Hurriyet English, 2009b) 
Turkey found an opportunity to use the crisis in Georgia to alleviate its rocky relationship 
with Armenia. Turkey began during the war to allow the flights over its airspace both from Armenia 
to the rest of the world, mainly to facilitate humanitarian assistance to Georgia. This could be one of 
the first steps towards reconciliation the two countries which have no diplomatic relations owing 
mainly to the Armenian genocide issue. (Turkish Daily News, 2008) A potential rapprochement 
could  also  attenuate  the  tensions  between  Azerbaijan  and  Armenia  in  the  dispute  concerning 
Nagorno-Karabakh.   
Turkey and  Azerbaijan  have always tried to achieve a consolidated relationship  based on 
historical  and  cultural  affinities.  Turkey  has  been  a  staunch  supporter  of  Azerbaijan  over  the 
Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  Moreover,  in  line  with  the  policy  of  supporting  the  BTC  (Baku–
Tbilisi–Ceyhan) route and the Nabucco pipeline as the main ways of exporting natural gas from the 
Caspian Sea, Turkey has been enhancing its relations with Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijan is 
considered to be the main source of Nabucco’s gas when the pipeline is opened, due by 2014. (BBC 
News, 2009)  
In  the  past, Turkey’s  strained  relationship  with  Greece  sprung  from  two  sensitive  issues: 
sovereignty and related rights in the area of the Aegean Sea and the dispute on Cyprus. The Aegean    
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dispute led twice to crises coming close to the outbreak of military hostilities, in 1987 and in early 
1996. Since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey made use of a series of diplomatic measures to 
improve its relations with Greece. Despite the fact no agreement was reached either on the Aegean 
border or on Cyprus, this thaw in  bilateral relations could be explained by a possible common 
recognition that a Turkey further anchored in the EU seems the only way to settle the disputes 
between the two countries. (European Commission, 2007, p. 58; Oguzlu, 2003, p. 48) 
In  the  case  of  Cyprus,  the  European  Commission  expects  Turkey  to  make  steps  towards 
normalisation of bilateral relations. (European Commission, 2007, p. 12) The island has two main 
ethnic communities: Greek 77%, Turkish 18%. (Cyprus-CIA World Fact Book, 2008) The long-
standing dispute burst out in 1974, when Turkey sent military forces to the island to protect the 
Turkish  minority  after  Greek-Cyprus  extremists  threatened  to  merge  with  Greece.  The  Greek 
Cypriots have alleged ever since that the Turkish troops are an invasion force, whereas Turkey 
claimed that it occupied the north part of the island in the effort to protect the Turkish Cypriots. The 
self-proclaimed  Turkish  Republic  of  North  Cyprus  (TRNC),  established  in  1983,  has  not  been 
recognised by any country apart from Turkey, and the UN declared the action illegal, while the 
government in Nicosia was regarded as the only legitimate authority. (Toffe, 2003, p. 140) Not even 
after the intervention in 2002 of the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with his plan – 
openly backed by Turkey – for the creation of a federal state on the island was a solution reached. 
Although in April 2004 TRNC accepted an agreement on unification, at Turkey’s pressure, the 
Republic of Cyprus rejected it considering  it as too pro-Turkish. (Smith, 2005, p. 278) Turkey 
endeavours to break this deadlock, could be explained by the fact that without a resolution, Cyprus 
could preclude Turkey from a future possible membership of the EU and its ESDP where as a full 
member the Republic of Cyprus holds veto power. (Arsu, 2008)  
Turkey’s  more  constructive  and  balanced  dialogue  with  Cyprus  demonstrates  its  growing 
openness towards the EU’s policy style. Whereas in the past, the Cyprus issue was treated very 
strictly and Turkey’s tendency was to act without analysing the possible consequences of its moves 
(for instance when it took the north part of island), today the AKP prefers a more benign, win-win 
approach to reach a favourable agreement. 
All things considered, it should be underlined that the aforementioned trends illustrate that 
Ankara’s foreign policy is gradually aligning with the EU’s mainstream. This stems mainly from 
the progressing process of integration into Europe’s diplomatic affairs culture and openness towards 
the Europeanization  mechanisms, because what is obvious  is that at least under AKP Turkey’s 
approach to establish and maintain a balance regional cooperation is, unlike the past, more in tune 
with a soft mentality.    
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Turkish politics  have  long  been characterized  by the  military  involvement  in shaping the 
domestic and foreign affairs, in order to preserve the Ataturk’s legacy, to protect the country against 
any threat emanating either from inside or outside Turkey’s borders and to inflict order whenever 
Turkey’s secular values seem to be endangered. (Park, 2005, p. 130) This sort of policy matched 
entirely Turkish approach towards extern relations backed up throughout the time by its defence 
task envisaged by NATO and the US firstly against the Soviet threat and secondly against the risks 
stemming from its problematic neighbourhood. This task found its expression through Turkey’s 
NATO membership and its close relation to the US. For the Kemalist Turkey with its political 
system  left  almost  unchanged  by  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  era,  the  road-map  covered  by  the 
Copenhagen criteria put the country’s chances to join the EU at risk due to its different political 
culture. (Park, 2005) 
Although hard security issues and architectures have not completely gone away, the AKP 
foreign policy approach shifted from military, coercive means and emphasised the Venus side of 
things  in  many  settings.  Turkey  realised  that  its  future  interests  are  better  served  and  its 
Westernization project is better fulfilled by being a part of a more benign West (Görener, 2005, p. 
7). 
As  Emerson  and  Tocci  put  it,  Turkey’s  importance  in  the  region  for  the  EU  could  be 
expressed through the terms bridgehead and spearhead: the continuing democratisation in Turkey 
would  be  a  bridgehead  and  a  model  for  its  neighbouring  countries,  whereas  its  new  approach 
towards foreign policy fostered under the Europeanization instruments could serve as a spearhead 
for the EU. Thus, Turkey could contribute even more to the European project of spreading out the 
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